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Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is
individual variation in task performance. In this paper, we first make the
case for why we should be interested in mapping individual differences in
task performance onto particular cognitive abilities: we suggest that it is cru-
cial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and
between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of
inhibitory control for non-human animals do indeed produce correlated task
performance; however, no clear pattern emerges that would support the
notion of a common cognitive ability underpinning individual differences
in performance. We advocate a psychometric approach involving a three-
step programme to make theoretical and empirical progress: first, we need
tasks that reveal signature limits in performance. Second, we need to
assess the reliability of individual differences in task performance. Third,
multi-trait multi-method test batteries will be instrumental in validating cog-
nitive abilities. Together, these steps will help us to establish what varies
between individuals that could impact their fitness and ultimately shape
the course of the evolution of animal minds. Finally, we propose executive
functions, including working memory, inhibitory control and attentional
shifting, as a sensible starting point for this endeavour.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Causes and consequences of
individual differences in cognitive abilities’.1. Introduction
The combination of the comparative method (i.e. comparing relevant traits
across species) and analysing individual differences has proved to be a
powerful approach to elucidate the evolution of physical traits. In principle,
understanding the evolution of cognition can benefit from a similar approach.
However, the study of cognitive evolution is complicated by the fact that cogni-
tion cannot be directly measured; instead, it must be inferred from measuring
the physical substrate that underpins it (the brain) and its expression (behav-
iour) [1]. Initial theories of cognitive evolution were based on differences in
relative brain size between taxa and correlations with various socio-ecological
factors such as group size [2–4] and dietary diversity [3,5]. Although brain
size is a crude index of cognitive ability [6], it does correlate with observational
records of behaviour, such as tool use, social learning and innovation, in both
mammals and birds [7,8]. Nevertheless, it has proved difficult to discriminate
between theories for cognitive evolution based on this indirect evidence [9].
A satisfying account of cognitive evolution must describe the trait that is
evolving more precisely.
Comparative psychologists have attempted to measure species differences
in cognition more directly, by conducting experiments on different species
either in the field or in the laboratory (for recent reviews, see [10,11]).
Though this brings us one step closer to measuring cognition, experimental
psychologists have long recognized that species differences in performance
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Such contributing causes include species differences in
perception, temperament, motor control, body morphology
and domain-general cognitive abilities that are peripheral to
the targeted cognitive ability [13]. Additionally, cohort differ-
ences in experience or demographics can complicate species
comparisons, particularly on a single task. Control conditions
(administered within the same species and cohort) can help
us ascertain that the results are not solely ascribable to
these peripheral factors, though it is hard to be exhaustive
in ruling out alternative causes for species differences in
this way. Another approach is to seek positive evidence
that the test is measuring the targeted ability through
examination of individual differences. In other words to
explore whether or not the cognitive ability can be shown
to contribute to performance across different tasks.
In recent years, there has therefore been a shift towards
examining individual variation in performance across mul-
tiple tasks rather than group performance in a single task
[14–16] (though the importance of individual variation has
been recognized for a long time, e.g. [17]). To that end,
researchers have designed and administered test batteries to
identify factors underlying individual differences in task per-
formance. Most of these studies to date have been concerned
with the question whether a common factor, commonly
referred to as g, can be identified that accounts for between-
subject variance across different tasks. Many comparative
studies have found evidence for such a factor; others have
not (for a recent review, see [18]). There are many possible
explanations for the existence of g and we agree with others
who have argued that evidence for a psychometric g factor
does not entail the presence or absence of an overarching,
domain-general reasoning ability that can be deployed for
very diverse purposes [19–21].
In this paper, one of our goals is to analyse different
approaches to test battery design with a view towards pro-
moting a more systematic approach. We argue that it is
time to go beyond the question whether or not g can be ident-
ified and advocate a three-step programme for designing test
batteries that can elucidate the structure of cognition (i.e.
what are the dissociable components of cognition and in
what way are they related with one another?). To this end,
the question of measurement is of central importance.
Which cognitive abilities can be validated across different
contexts (e.g. different behavioural tasks) and measured
reliably across time? Little work to date has been dedicated
to this important question. Giving more attention to validat-
ing cognitive abilities (see box 1 for the definition and
discussion of test validity) will allow us to answer more
detailed questions regarding the causes and consequences
of individual differences in cognition [16,29]. Rather than
looking for socio-ecological correlates of g, one can look
for correlations between particular cognitive abilities and
certain socio-ecological variables [12]. An example for such
a targeted approach is the correlation between inhibitory con-
trol measures and fission–fusion dynamics across different
primate species [23]. This kind of process-oriented approach
could also be used within species to study the consequences
of individual differences. While some recent evidence
suggests that problem-solving abilities are related to fitness
[30–32], other studies have not found this association [33].
However, it is largely unclear which (or indeed whether [13])
cognitive abilities underlie successful problem-solving inthese cases. Uncovering whether or not variation in individual
performance reliably measures variation in a certain cognitive
ability is, we argue, a logical precursor to interpreting
correlations with fitness (or lack thereof). If individual differ-
ences in task performance result largely from differences in
experience or motivation, such differences are unlikely to be
related to fitness, as they are transient. Conversely, if individ-
ual differences track body condition or health, correlations
with fitness might be expected because of some interaction
with this third variable, whether or not the task is a valid
measure of a certain cognitive ability. Finally, with infor-
mation about which cognitive abilities can be identified and
how they are related to one another (i.e. the structure of
cognition), one could start to ask further questions about
how cognition evolves: for example, are certain abilities
likely to undergo correlated evolution, or might they be
traded off against one another?2. Targeted test batteries: from g to more
specific questions
The first step in test battery design is to specify the cognitive
abilities to be tested. The second step is to specify what tasks
are supposed to measure these abilities. Both trait (e.g. short-
term memory) and task (e.g. finding food under a cup after
a delay) selection will probably affect the latent variable
structure supported by the study. Despite its influence on
the generalizability of the results, often little justification of
the trait and task selection is provided, especially in test
batteries looking for a g factor. An unbalanced task selection,
for example with a bias on learning tasks or spatial cognition
tasks, might limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the
results [16,29].
Two main approaches guiding trait and task selection can
be identified. The first, which we have labelled the ‘ethologi-
cal’ approach, is based on a careful analysis of a species’
socio-ecological challenges and its typical behavioural
solutions to these challenges. We will review an example for
this approach, the primate cognition test battery (PCTB) [34].
The benefit of this approach is that it provides researchers
with a good starting point for the design of ethologically
valid tasks that are likely to tap into survival-relevant cogni-
tive abilities. However, these tasks have usually not been
designed with the explicit goal of investigating correlations
of between-subject variation in performance. This can result
in tasks that do not yield large between-subject variation, for
instance, due to ceiling or floor effects or due to an insufficient
number of trials per individual. The second, ‘psychological’
approach to test battery construction, is based on previous
cognitive studies with the same or different species (e.g.
based on the human psychometric literature). This approach
is anchored in specific hypotheses about cognitive abilities
which guide task selection criteria. For example, these hypoth-
eses might specify response profiles (i.e. how an individual’s
performance is affected by different experimental manipula-
tions) or error patterns in performance that the candidate
tasks should provoke. In practice, the two approaches can
overlap. Irrespective of the approach taken, using an estab-
lished test battery for a different species might require
significant task adjustments. Initial experimentation is essen-
tial to ensure that the tasks are suitable for the species of
Box 1. Establishing test validity.
Content validity
The starting point for establishing content validity is to determine the nature of a cognitive ability on theoretical and/or
empirical grounds. In other words, researchers need to agree on features defining the ability of interest [22]. Often the rich
body of cognitive research with humans can provide initial guidelines, especially in cases with limited pre-existing compara-
tive research. The aim is to make predictions about response profiles, error patterns or signature limits that are specific to the
cognitive ability under investigation. Based on these considerations, researchers can design experiments in which they
manipulate task complexity to reveal the hypothesized response profiles and signature limits within individuals. At the
group level, these signature limits should also be evident in comparison with control conditions that do not tax the targeted
cognitive ability to the same extent as the test condition.
In the realm of executive functions (EFs), such content validity criteria include susceptibility to task interference in work-
ing memory tasks and switch costs in attentional set-shifting paradigms. Inhibitory control measures should yield response
profiles and signature limits indicative of a prepotent response. Variability in inhibitory control can only be measured when
there is some prepotency or interference that needs to be overridden. Prepotency, however, can only be shown when indi-
viduals at least occasionally make mistakes (e.g. when individuals of a species occasionally bump into a transparent cylinder
when they try to reach a reward inside the cylinder). Ceiling (or floor) effects in performance make it impossible to establish
content validity (e.g. great ape species performed close to or at ceiling in inhibitory control tasks including the cylinder and
the A-not-B error task [23–25]). Ideally, researchers can design experiments that manipulate the task complexity with respect
to the signature limits they are interested in. For inhibitory control tasks, this can be realized by manipulating the strength of
the prepotent response. For example, in a go/no-go paradigm, increasing the relative frequency of go trials should negatively
impact on the no-go performance [26].
Another strategy to reduce interpretational ambiguity is to focus on error patterns. Often mistakes can be more informative
than success [27]. However, even if the performance is not at ceiling, errors might be related to factors other than the prepotent
response (e.g. motivation and distractibility). Sometimes the task design canmitigate this problem by including various oppor-
tunities for making mistakes. The type of mistakes may hint towards different underlying causes. An example of such a task
design is the A-not-B error task with three aligned cups: repeated exposure to hiding events of a target object under cup A
can induce a search response towards cup A even when in probe trials the target object is hidden under cup B in full view
of the participant (the so-called A-not-B error). Adding a third cup (C) to the set-up that is never used as a hiding place
allows for distinguishing between inhibitory control errors (cup A) induced by the previous exposure to cup A hiding
events and unspecific mistakes (cup C) in probe trials (when the target object is in cup B). In this way, adding different options
for making mistakes will improve the task design by allowing the content validity of the task to be assessed.
Construct validity
Construct validity aims at triangulating variables (constructs) that account for variance in task performance [22]. Multiple
tasks aiming at the same ability (but differing in peripheral task demands and stimulus appearance) should ideally produce
shared variance in performance attributable to a common factor (convergent validity). Conversely, tasks that aim to measure
different traits should not produce highly shared variance (discriminant validity). Convergent and discriminant validity
together bolster construct validity. Based on shared variance across tasks alone, it remains unclear what the shared variance
actually represents (e.g. general intelligence or a more specific cognitive ability). Multiple traits should therefore be examined
within the same test battery to tease out what is shared and what is distinct, to discriminate and label latent variables. In this
way, a multi-trait multi-method approach can help to establish construct validity and to elucidate the structure of cognitive
abilities [28].
Correlating task performance at the species or group level is not sufficient for establishing construct validity at the indi-
vidual level (within each species of interest). This is because species may differ in their performance in multiple tests due to
differences in another variable (such as motivation), leading to correlated performance at the group level but not at the
individual level.
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tantly related taxon (e.g. from primates to birds or fish [35,36]).
In the next sections, we will briefly review the results
of the ‘ethological’ and ‘psychological’ approaches to test
battery construction with examples from studies of primate
cognitive evolution. Following this analysis, we will propose
some guiding principles for test battery design that arise from
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the work to date.(a) The primate cognition test battery
Herrmann et al. [34] initially designed the PCTB to compare
the cognitive abilities of different great ape species (2.5-year-old human children, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)) at the group level. In line
with the ‘ethological’ approach, the design of the test battery
was based on a review of the primate cognition literature
examining challenges from the physical and social cognitive
domains [37]. Although task design in the PCTB was
anchored in the challenges faced by these species in their
daily lives (to find and locate food, use tools and deal
with conspecifics), the hypothesis being tested had to do
with the structure of the underlying cognition: namely that
social cognition would be dissociable from physical cognition
and capable of evolving separately. The group-level analysis
revealed some support for this notion, because 2.5-year-old
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social cognitive domain but performed similarly to chimpan-
zees in the physical cognitive domain. However, as described
above, these species differences in some tasks but not others
could still, in principle, be the result of non-cognitive species
differences [38,39].
Analysis of individual differences in performance can be
used to further investigate the structure of cognition. In a later
reanalysis of the original dataset of chimpanzees (N ¼ 106)
and children (N ¼ 105) [40], between-subject variation in
performance was examined even though the PCTB was not
designed for this purpose. A confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) did not endorse the original division of the test battery
into a social and a physical cognitive domain, though it did
yield dissociable components. Instead, a spatial cognition
factor could be identified in both chimpanzees and human
children. For children, there were two additional factors,
one that included the shared variance of some of the non-
spatial physical cognition tasks (i.e. tool use and numerical
cognition) and one capturing individual variation in social
cognition tasks. For chimpanzees, there was one additional
factor onto which some of the social and (non-spatial)
physical cognition tasks loaded.
In a replication of the PCTB with another chimpanzee
sample (N ¼ 99), Hopkins et al. [41] found a different under-
lying structure using a principal component analysis (PCA):
all spatial cognition tasks loaded on component 1, tool-related
tasks and causal reasoning tasks loaded on component 2 and
all social cognitive tasks loaded on a third component.
Hopkins et al. also found evidence for test–retest reliability
of the measures, though there was some improvement in the
spatial and numerical cognition tasks over time. They also
found evidence for a common g factor. Moreover, they
found evidence for heritability of this composite score.
Multiple differences could account for inconsistent latent
variable structures between the two chimpanzee studies:
apart from differences in the statistical analyses (CFA versus
PCA), the later study by Hopkins et al. [41] included only
13 out of the original 15 tasks. One of these tasks, the addition
task, loaded on the physical–social factor identified by
Herrmann et al. [40]. It is therefore possible that the inconsist-
ent results might be due to methodological differences
between the studies rather than differences between the two
chimpanzee samples. This highlights the vital importance of
task choice and inclusion in test battery design. Nevertheless,
the results from the PCTB yielded patterns of correlation
and dissociation that provided some evidence for construct
validity (box 1), in particular for spatial cognition, although
the details of cognitive mechanisms underlying these
common factors remain opaque.(b) Beyond g and social/physical cognition?
In the following, we will review some studies that have been
anchored in a more ‘psychological’ approach to test battery
design. Rather than starting from ethology and using factor
analysis to examine the structure of the underlying cognition,
these studies start from hypotheses about the nature of
cognition and have compared species that inhabit different
socio-ecological niches to examine hypotheses about the
evolutionary causes/consequences of differences in specific
cognitive abilities. Apart from the aforementioned studiesof g, most of the studies using this approach have focused
on inhibitory control.(c) Inhibitory control
Inhibitory control is often described as a component of EFs, a
suite of domain-general, partially independent cognitive
abilities that are important in maintaining goals even in the
presence of interference and switching flexibly between
goals [42–44]. Inhibitory control (for a critique of this term,
see [45]) includes response inhibition and interference
control. Response inhibition refers to the top-down capacity
to suppress a (stimulus-driven) prepotent response and/or
to activate another (memory-based) response instead. Inter-
ference control refers to the ability to focus on goal-relevant
information in the presence of distracting information (for a
recent overview article on the terminology and definitions,
see [44]).
Such a domain-general cognitive ability should lead to
consistent individual differences across different contexts. In
the human literature, the evidence for such a common cogni-
tive ability is mixed [46–50]. A large-scale meta-analysis
(based on 282 samples and over 33 000 participants) examined
convergent validity of self-control measures with human
adults [51]. They found modest convergence of measures of
self-control (defined here as ‘top-down processes that inhibit
or obviate impulses’ [51, p. 260]) with informant-report and
self-report questionnaires yielding the highest convergence
scores and executive function tasks (the most frequently
used tasks were go/no-go, Stroop and set-shifting paradigms)
exhibiting smaller, yet significant convergent validity with
other EF tasks (average Pearson’s correlation coefficient
among EF tasks: r ¼ 0.15). There was also a significant corre-
lation among delay of gratification tasks (DoG; average
correlation coefficient: r ¼ 0.21) but notably no significant cor-
relations between DoG and other EF tasks (average correlation
coefficient: r ¼ 0.11). It has been suggested that temporal dis-
counting makes DoG tasks different from other inhibitory
control tasks [10]. Temporal discounting refers to the degra-
dation of the subjective value of a reward with increasing
delays. Individual differences in temporal discounting might
therefore be supported by different cognitive processes
[44,52]. Indeed, investigations of the neural correlates of
response inhibition and choice impulsivity (or temporal
discounting) cast doubt on whether the same cognitive
processes are involved here [53], which would explain the
inconsistent individual differences between DoG and other
self-control tasks.
Nevertheless, this meta-analysis is consistent with the
notion of some common cognitive ability underpinning
tasks aiming at measuring inhibitory control in humans,
though it seems unlikely to be unitary. In fact, it has been pro-
posed that inhibitory control can be further decomposed into
three subcomponents including stimulus detection, action
selection and action execution [54]. Whether this common
factor should be labelled inhibitory control (or a suite of
inhibitory control abilities) depends on whether discriminant
validity (box 1) can be established with other constructs such
as general intelligence, shifting and working memory. An
assessment of individual differences in EF in humans
showed that tasks aiming at measuring inhibitory control
did not load onto an independent factor but on a common
factor of EF [43]. It therefore seems questionable to treat all
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Figure 1. Mean performance (+s.e.) in the cylinder task ( per cent correct out of 10 trials) of the MacLean et al. [24] dataset as a function of species (ranked by
overall performance in the cylinder task) and performance in the A-not-B error task (correct/incorrect, 1 trial). Only the performance of individuals that completed
both tasks is shown.
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paradigms) as primary measures of inhibitory control (we
discuss the task impurity problem further below).
In the comparative literature, two fairly large-scale
studies have administered cognitive test batteries that were
explicitly designed to compare species in their inhibitory
control ability [23,24]. However, without first establishing
convergent and divergent validity of the deployed inhibition
measures, it is unclear if this would assay one ability or sev-
eral. Amici et al. [23] presented five tasks aiming at inhibitory
control to six different primate species. Some of these tasks
were based on classical psychological tasks of inhibitory con-
trol (e.g. the A-not-B error); others were somewhat more
ethologically grounded, such as detour-reaching tasks. They
found an association between performance on these tasks
and sociality, with species that have a more fluid social
structure (fission–fusion) performing better on average
than those with less complex social organization. MacLean
et al. [24] presented two inhibitory control tasks (A-not-B
and the cylinder task, a detour-reaching test) to 567 individ-
uals representing 36 species with a wide phylogenetic
coverage. They found a correlation between test performance
and absolute brain volume (but see [55,56] for recent
evidence with corvids questioning this finding) and, for
primates, an association with ecology (dietary diversity).
Implicit in the rationale for both studies is that inhibitory
control is a unitary, domain-general ability undergoing
evolutionary change, though the results point to different
selection pressures at work. However, although performance
in the A-not-B error and cylinder task of the MacLean et al.
dataset was correlated at the species level (when controlling
for phylogeny [24]), individual differences were not exam-
ined. In the following, we examine these datasets from an
individual differences perspective, to explore the evidenceto date for construct validity of inhibitory control in the
comparative framework (box 1). However, it should be noted
that only three of the species in the Amici et al. dataset (spider
monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi, N ¼ 18; capuchin monkeys, Sapajus
apella, N ¼ 27; long-tailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis,
N ¼ 12) received more than two trials per task and can pro-
vide therefore measures of individual variance; similarly,
only a subset of individuals in the MacLean et al. study
received both tasks (N ¼ 216).
To test the convergence of the two measures administered
by MacLean et al. [24], we modelled the influence of accuracy
in the A-not-B error task (1 trial: correct/incorrect) on the
performance in the cylinder task (number of correct
responses: 0–10). If the two tasks measure individual differ-
ences in the same cognitive ability, i.e. response inhibition,
one might predict that individuals who choose the correct
cup in the A-not-B error task would also perform well in
the cylinder task (compared with individuals who committed
the A-not-B error). We included all tested species from the
MacLean et al. dataset with more than six individuals partici-
pating in both tasks (in total 192 individuals representing
15 species, figure 1). We used a Poisson generalized linear
mixed model (GLMM) to analyse the number of correct
trials in the cylinder task and added A-not-B error task per-
formance as the predictor variable and species and subject ID
as a random effect (see the electronic supplementary material
for more information on model assumptions and the detailed
model output). We found that the A-not-B error task was not
significantly associated with the cylinder task performance
(GLMM 01: x2ð1Þ ¼ 2.13, p¼ 0.145). When we excluded two
species that exhibited ceiling effects in the A-not-B error task
(orangutans andolive baboons), the p-valuewas slightly smaller
(GLMM 02: x2ð1Þ ¼ 3:28, p ¼ 0.070). However, if anything,
individuals that successfully located the food in the A-not-B
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ing to the model by 18%) compared with those that committed
the A-not-B error (estimate+ s.e: 20.19+0.11, 95% CI [20.41,
0.02]). The overall pattern of results did not change when we
only analysed the 10 primate species (GLMM 03). The power
to detect an estimate of 0.3 (corresponding to a 35% increase
in cylinder task performance) for the predictor A-not-B Error
Task Performance was 81.2% for GLMM 01 (GLMM 02:
73.9%; GLMM 03: 61.2%; see the electronic supplementary
material for details). In line with these results, a previous
study in dogs (Canis familiaris, N ¼ 30) focusing on individual
differences did not find evidence for convergent validity of
these two tasks [57]. Similarly, a recent study with pheasants
(Phasianus colchicus, N ¼ 81) found no evidence for correlated
performance in two detour tasks involving transparent
materials blocking direct access to a food reward [58]. More-
over, the content validity of the A-not-B paradigm has
recently been challenged, as hand-tracking training but not
experience with another inhibitory control task (reversal learn-
ing) substantially improved theA-not-B error task performance
of New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) [56].
In the Amici et al. dataset [23], we correlated individual
performance across four different inhibitory control measures
(see the electronic supplementary material). The sample sizes
for each pairwise comparison ranged from 5 to 19 depending
on the task comparison and the species. The small sample
sizes and resulting low power (7–24% assuming a medium
effect of r ¼ 0.3; see the electronic supplementary material)
would therefore not allow us to detect weak to moderate
correlations. To detect medium effects with a satisfactory
power of 80%, a sample size of 84 individuals would be
required. However, we expected to find at least positive
correlation coefficients if these tasks measured the same
underlying ability. We found no such simple picture. In par-
ticular, the delay of gratification (DoG) task did not seem to
be related consistently with the other inhibitory control
measures within any of the different species (five out of
nine correlation coefficients were negative). Indeed, there
was even a significant negative correlation between DoG
and the middle-cup task for the spider monkeys. The other
tasks showed more consistent individual differences within
each species (eight out of nine correlation coefficients were
positive across species, but only two of these correlations
were also statistically significant; see the electronic sup-
plementary material). These tasks relied on prepotent
responses induced by tendencies to either reach for visible
food directly (Plexiglas hole), repeat previously rewarded
choices (A-not-B error) or follow a proximity bias when
searching for hidden food rewards (middle cup). The lack of
relationship between DoG and other inhibitory control
measures in this study is consistent with the above-mentioned
meta-analysis of the EF literature with human adults, which
found no clear pattern of correlation between DoG tasks and
other EF tasks (including classic response inhibition tasks [51]).
From our analysis of the studies on inhibitory control, we
have found little evidence for convergent validity in this cog-
nitive domain. Importantly, even if the multiple measures
had yielded correlated performance, it would remain unclear
what the shared variance represents. For example, even if we
had found evidence for convergence of different inhibitory
control measures, we still would not know whether we
could attribute the shared variance to inhibitory control or
another ability. The lack of convergent validity of differentinhibitory control measures might be attributable to low stat-
istical power (especially in the case of the Amici et al. dataset)
or masking effects of confounding factors (other cognitive
abilities, non-cognitive factors including motivation, etc.), or
it might indicate that inhibitory control is not a unitary
ability. Only the multi-trait multi-method approach with suf-
ficient sample sizes could help to mitigate this interpretational
challenge by establishing both convergent and discriminant
validity. Following the human literature on EF, multiple
measures per trait (e.g. updating, shifting and inhibition)
would be needed [43]. As we have seen in this section, further
task development for non-human animals is required for the
assessment of inhibitory control. In the final section, we
discuss how the multi-trait multi-method approach might
be implemented in comparative psychology.3. The structure of cognition: a problem with
two unknowns
Our review of the literature has identified several pitfalls in
the use of test batteries to elucidate the structure of individual
differences from a comparative perspective, even when
studies focused on a single trait (e.g. inhibitory control)
measured by multiple tasks. One of the main challenges for
the investigation of individual differences in cognitive abilities
is that we start with two unknowns: first, we do not know
what our tasks measure (the so-called task impurity problem;
see [59]) and, second, we do not know which cognitive traits
exist and can be measured within a species (the construct
validity problem).
All behavioural tasks are ‘impure’, in the sense that it is
not possible to isolate and measure a cognitive ability with
a single task. Confounding factors that contribute to task
performance are other cognitive abilities (apart from the
target ability) and non-cognitive factors including motiv-
ation, personality traits [60,61] and prior experience [13].
To complicate matters even further, the cognitive and non-
cognitive factors that contribute to task performance might
vary between individuals, and they may not lead to stable
effects across time. For example, over time some individuals,
unlike others, might adopt strategies to cope with the task
demands more efficiently which in turn will affect the
cognitive load of the task for these individuals.
We advocate a three-step solution to tackle these
problems:
1. First, establish content validity. Does performance on
the task accord with theoretical principles underlying the
hypothesized ability? There are two main tools to examin-
ing this: firstly, signature limits in performance, and
secondly systematic variation across conditions. Signature
limits refers to the way individuals make mistakes (includ-
ing commission and omission mistakes). Analysing these
error patterns can help to establish the content validity of
a task [27]. Systematic variation refers to initial experimen-
tal work showing at the group level that the test condition
differs from control conditions in meaningful ways (as
predicted by the targeted ability). Importantly, tasks that
reveal such signature limits or systematic variation need
to be established for every species under study, as a task
that has demonstrable content validity for one species
might not be appropriate for another.
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reliability) of candidate measures. Only tasks that yield a
consistent ranking of individual performance over time
are good candidates for capturing cognitive abilities.
Depending on the ability under investigation, learning
effects might hinder the assessment of test–retest reliability
(e.g. due to ceiling effects in the retest). Changing the task-
relevant stimuli between test and retest can help to remedy
this problem.
3. Third, valid and reliable measures of individual variation
in a cognitive ability can be combined in a multi-trait
multi-method test battery to deal with task impurity and
the construct validity problem [28]. The aim of such a
latent variable approach is to establish convergent and
discriminant validity, the constituents of construct validity
(box 1).
Each of these steps aiming at content validity, repeatabil-
ity and construct validity will require intense and possibly
coordinated research effort. Our contention is that these
steps should be undertaken in order for a study of individual
differences in cognition to be maximally meaningful. Fortu-
nately, each of the steps constitutes interesting research
questions in its own right.
One complication concerns the optimal choice of tasks at
each step. Step 1 is made easier with robust effects (replicable
at the group level) that can support statistical tests between
different conditions. However, there is no guarantee that a
valid and robust test of an ability will yield individual vari-
ation in that ability across individuals, which is needed for
Steps 2 and 3. In fact, the most robust tests may not translate
into reliable measures of individual differences precisely
because they tend to be associated with small between-
subject variance [48]. Moreover, it is important to consider
what kind of dependent variables are extracted from the
task. Difference scores (e.g. test condition performance
subtracted by control condition performance) can have a
lower signal-to-noise ratio compared with their constituents
(e.g. the test condition performance) and therefore might
not provide sensitive measures [48,62]. Nevertheless, differ-
ence scores might remove systematic between-subject
variation in performance unrelated to the cognitive ability
under investigation (which is desirable for Step 3). Having
the three-step programme in mind at the outset of task
design is therefore beneficial for future-proofing tasks, for
example by exploring multiple levels of difficulty in Step 1,
to allow difficulty to be titrated at Steps 2 and 3 to avoid
floor and ceiling effects.4. Future directions for the psychological
approach
We deem EFs a good starting point for the assessment of indi-
vidual differences in behavioural flexibility for multiple
reasons: EFs are thought to be domain-general processes
that affect the performance in most behavioural tasks.
Twin studies suggest that individual differences in EFs in
humans are almost entirely of genetic origin [63]. Moreover,
EFs are correlated with mental and physical health measures
in humans (for a review, see [42]) and survival (in the context
of chronic illness [64]). Thus, EFs might also be the idealcandidate for looking into causes and consequences of
individual differences in cognition.
To date, most research attention has been devoted to three
skills that together are thought to represent the pillars of EF:
working memory updating, attentional shifting (also known
as set-shifting or cognitive flexibility) and inhibition (including
response inhibition and interference control). The multi-trait
multi-method approach has been applied to study the struc-
ture of individual differences in EFs in humans, including
multiple tasks aiming at updating, shifting and inhibition
[43,59]. According to one of the most influential models of
human executive functions by Miyake & Friedman [65],
there is a common factor onto which all of these tasks load.
Additionally, there are two nested factors, an updating-
specific factor and a shifting-specific factor, that represent
the shared variance unique to the updating and shifting
tasks. The shared variance of the inhibition tasks, however,
cannot be differentiated from the common EF factor. In
human preschool children, in contrast, a single factor seems
to be sufficient to account for individual differences across
EF tasks [66,67]. The latent variable structure underpinning
individual differences in cognition might thus be subject to
developmental change. Systematic differences in the age
structure of different study samples can therefore not be
neglected when different species are compared.
One might argue that identifying the latent variable struc-
ture of performance on EF tasks does not eliminate reference
to control homunculi or black boxes [54]. While this is true,
identifying such latent variable structure might serve as an
intermediary step towards a more mechanistic model of EF
[68]. Breaking down EF into its fundamental components
will probably require iterative applications of the multi-trait
multi-method approach. Conversely, inspiration for task
designs and task selection can also be drawn from existing
computational or mechanistic models of EF (e.g. [54,69,70]).
For example, models that decompose executive control of
actions further (e.g. into signal detection, action selection
and action execution [54]) can help to make predictions
about response profiles and signature limits. Besides, such
models might help to explain why convergent validity of
inhibitory control measures has proved hard to establish.
Any of the proposed action control subcomponents (or a
certain combination thereof) might explain individual
differences in task performance.
In the comparative literature, individual differences in
EFs have not been systematically investigated [71]. There
are some notable exceptions linking g to working memory
performance in mice [72,73]. Moreover, a meta-analysis
reported in this issue provides evidence for low to moderate
convergent validity and test–retest reliability estimates for a
number of different tasks (including inhibition and reversal
learning tasks) and species [74]. In most taxa, however,
research looking into the structure of individual differences
in EF is missing. Fortunately, there are a number of para-
digms that have been used to tax different EFs, including
working memory (e.g. [75,76]) and inhibitory control tasks
(e.g. [23,24,77,78]). The first steps towards a psychometric
examination of EF in non-human animals will be to establish
the content validity and reliability of these paradigms in
different species.
Valid measures of EFs will also help us to interpret
individual differences in more specific domains. Most behav-
ioural tasks, especially the ones that require a change in
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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degree (but increasing experience with task-relevant contin-
gencies can lead to automatized control processes due to
learning [44,54,79]). It is therefore important to examine the
extent to which observed differences in task performance
are due to differences in EF. For instance, it has been
suggested that the development of EF over the preschool
years may constrain, or enable, the emergence of abilities
such as theory of mind and object permanence [80,81]. Inter-
estingly, it is possible that a similar argument could apply
over a phylogenetic time scale [82].Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
373:201702835. Conclusion
Investigating the structure of individual differences in cogni-
tive performance within a species will lead to insights into
the causes and consequences of individual variation, and it
will allow for more informative comparisons across species.
To this end, we need to refine the assessment of individual
differences in behavioural flexibility. Following a classic psy-
chometrics approach, we advocated a three-step programme:
first, experimental work to establish paradigms that yield
response profiles indicative of the targeted ability; second,
assessments of reliability of individual differences across
time; third, multi-trait multi-method test batteries to establish
validity of the targeted ability. Elucidating the structure of
cognition across different species will be a challenging endea-
vour. One of the biggest obstacles will be to obtain sufficient
sample sizes. For many species (including most primate
species) that are difficult to access and whose sample sizes
in captivity are usually small, the only remedy will be
large-scale collaborative projects across laboratories or field
sites. This will certainly be no easy feat especially because
such expensive, long-term projects are difficult to realize in
an academic environment with short-term funding, but
there are encouraging examples in related research areas
that show the feasibility of such projects (e.g. the ManyBabies
project [83]). A first pilot project aiming at establishing large-
scale collaboration in the field of comparative cognition is
currently underway (the ManyPrimates project [84]).
In this article, we cautioned against taking short-cuts
when constructing test batteries. Given the amount of workthat is necessary to conduct a test battery with a sufficiently
large number of individuals, a trial-and-error approach
cannot be recommended. Borrowing the test battery design
from research with another species will probably result in
biased outcomes; in the worst scenario, it might lead to
ceiling or floor effects. New task designs and pilot work
to establish certain response signatures (the content validity)
within each species are advisable before the assembly of
the test battery. Ideally, tasks are used that are scalable in
difficulty to maximize the variance in the dataset.
Finally, we suggest that it is time to go beyond g or the
physical/social cognition divide. Executive functions with
their strong genetic component [63], correlation to health
markers [42] and domain generality (as established with
humans) are arguably a prime candidate and a logical
starting point for this endeavour. Measuring individual
differences in EFs will also help to interpret individual vari-
ation in more specialized abilities. To date, most research in
this area has been devoted to inhibitory control and we
provide here evidence that the convergent validity of some
widely used measures cannot be taken for granted and will
require further investigation. Future experimental work is
needed to establish reliable and valid measures of other EFs
including attention shifting and working memory updating.
Whenever possible, fitness and health measures and genetic
samples might be added to the data collection to assess
potential fitness consequences and to estimate heritability.
In the long run, identifying the latent structure of cognitive
abilities in a variety of species will allow us to trace back
the evolutionary history of these abilities.
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